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This Note argues that courts should extend Chevron deference to presiden-
tial interpretations of ambiguities in foreign affairs and national security
statutes delegating lawmaking to the President. By examining one such in-
stance-the amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act authoriz-
ing execution of bloched assets of terrorist states and President Clinton's
interpretation of this amendment's ambiguous waiver proision-this Note
shows that the rationales of Chevron-delegation, denocratic accountabil-
ity, and expertise-would all be served by deferring to the President's
interpretation.
The ambiguity of the waiver provision suggests that Congress could not
resolve the issue of the waivers scope. In light of Chevron, this suggests
that Congress left the resolution of the issue to the body it best saw fit to do
so-the President. Furthermore, extending Chevron's presumption of im-
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plicit delegation to ambiguities within statutes to be implemented by the Presi-
dent would be superior to the case-by-case interpretation of ambiguities
presently offered by courts. Congress will be aware of and enjoy the benefits
associated with the presumption of implied delegation to the President, as it
does with the presumption of implied delegation to the agencies.
Next, because the President is more democratically accountable than the
courts, and indeed, even more than the agencies, the second rationale of
Chevron, that of democratic accountability, would also be further served by
extending judicial deference to presidential interpretations of ambiguities in
foreign affairs and national security statutes.
Finally, the third rationale of Chevron, that of expertise, would be
served by extending Chevron deference to presidential interpretations of am-
biguities in foreign affairs and national security statutes because these stat-
utes fall into the President's area of expertise.
Therefore, courts would further the rationales of the Chevron doctrine
by extending Chevron deference to presidential interpretations of statutes
involving national security and foreign affairs.
INTRODUCTION
In the landmark' case of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,2 the Supreme Court formulated a two-step test to
govern the deference a reviewing court should extend to an agency's
interpretation of an ambiguous statute Congress has entrusted the
agency to administer.3 Under the Chevron doctrine, if the reviewing
court, "employing traditional tools of statutory construction, '4 deter-
mines that Congress has spoken directly on a precise issue, then the
court "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con-
gress."5 If after examining the text and legislative history of the stat-
ute, the reviewing court determines that a statute is silent or
ambiguous regarding a particular issue, the court must defer to any
reasonable interpretation made by the implementing agency. 6
This Note proposes to expand the scope of the Chevron doctrine
beyond deference to agency interpretations-and extend judicial def-
erence to presidential interpretations of ambiguities in statutes in the
1 Chevron is generally perceived as a watershed decision that "was intended to be a
sea change in the way courts reviewed agency decisions." ErikaJones et al., Developments in
Judicial Review with Emphasis an the Concepts of Standing and Deference to the Agency, 4 ADMIN.
LJ. AM. U. 113, 139 (1990); see Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: SeparatingInterpretation
and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. Am. U. 187, 187 (1992) ("The Supreme
Court's decision in Chevron... has become perhaps the central case of modem administra-
tive law."). For a more thorough discussion regarding the impact of Chevron, see infra Part
II.
2 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3 Id. at 842-43.
4 Id at 843 n.9.
5 Id. at 843.
6 Id. at 843-44.
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realm of foreign affairs and national security that delegate lawmnaking
power to the President 7 This Note will show that the rationales un-
derlying the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron to mandate judicial
deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes apply to
delegations of lawmaking power to the President, and it therefore sug-
gests extending judicial deference to presidential interpretations of
such ambiguities in foreign affairs and national security statutes. This
Note analyzes one such presidential interpretation of an ambiguity in
a foreign affairs and national security statute that delegated a lawmak-
ing power to the President and demonstrates that the rationales of
Chevron are served by extending judicial deference to this presidential
interpretation.
In Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba (Alejandre Ii), the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida determined that a
recent amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 9
authorizes the attachment of blocked property of foreign terrorist
states, or their agencies or instrumentalities, in actions to enforce
judgments for claims brought as a result of terrorist activities by such
states.' 0 The court ruled that Alejandre was entitled to blocked Cu-
ban assets held by various U.S. corporations, and it ordered that these
assets be garnished in aid of execution of ajudgment against Cuba in
Alejandre's favor."1 In reaching this decision, the court rejected Presi-
dent Clinton's interpretation of a w-aiver provision contained in this
amendment to the FSIA,12 which gives the President of the United
7 For an explanation and examples of the types of statutes to which this applies-
foreign affairs or national security statutes delegating lawmaking power to the President-
see infra note 94. This Note does not attempt to determine the proper scope of the delega-
tion of lawmaking power to the President, nor does this Note implicate the nondelegation
doctrine. It argues for extension of Clmevon deference to presidential interpretation of
ambiguities in foreign affairs or national security statutes that delegate some lawmaking
power to the President, but it does not address how much lawmiaking power Congress can
constitutionally afford the President. That determination is not critical to the analysis of
this Note. The Supreme Court has not invalidated a federal statute based on the nondele-
gation doctrine since A.L.A. ScdedzterPoulby Corp. v. United Statcs 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1989) (rejecting a nondelegation chal-
lenge to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
8 42 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (S.D. Fla.), vacated ky Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga Distancia
de P.1L, Inc., 183 F.3d 1277 (lth Cir. 1999); see also infra Part I.C (discussing Aleandref1).
9 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (f) (1) (A) (Supp. IV 1998).
10 Alejandre/1, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1323-24.
11 Id at 1343. The blocked assets were actually those of Empresa de Telecomunica-
ciones de Cuba, S.A. (ETECSA), a Cuban telecommunications corporation, that the court
found to be "an 'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state'" under the FSIA. Id. at 1336.
ETECSA's assets were blocked and held by various U.S. corporations, including AT&T and
MCI. Id. at 1343. Alejandre had previously won an extrajudicial killing action against
Cuba in Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
12 Pub. L No. 105-277, div. A., title I, sec. 101(h), § 117(a), 112 Stat. 2631, 2681-491
(1998) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f) (1) (A), (1) (B), (2) (A), (2) (B) (Supp.
IV 1998)).
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States authority to waive the provision allowing such attachment.'I
The court found that both the language14 and legislative history5 of
this amendment to the FSIA were ambiguous in regard to the scope of
the President's waiver authority. Relying on post-legislative statements
of several representatives, 16 the court gave its own interpretation to
the statute limiting the scope of the waiver. 17
The Alejandre ! court then rejected a number of challenges to its
interpretation,' 8 including the argument that it should defer to the
executive's interpretation of an ambiguous statute based on the Chev-
ron doctrine. 19 The court correctly pointed out that the Chevron doc-
trine dictates that courts defer to an agency's reasonable
interpretation of ambiguous statutes which Congress has mandated
that the agency administer,20 and thus it does not apply to President
Clinton's interpretation of the scope of the waiver provision of the
FSIA section authorizing attachment of blocked property.21
This Note demonstrates that the same rationales that gave rise to
the Chevron doctrine ofjudicial deference to agency interpretations of
ambiguities in statutes that the agency is authorized to administer ap-
ply equally to judicial deference to the President's interpretation of
the ambiguous waiver provision in the FSIA amendment. These ratio-
nales-delegation, 22 democratic accountability, 23 and expertise 2"-
would all be served if the Alejandre II court had deferred to President
Clinton's interpretation of this ambiguity in a statute dealing with for-
eign affairs and national security that delegates lawmaking powers to
the President. This in turn suggests, and thus this Note argues, that
the rationales of Chevron would be similarly served by expanding the
'3 Alejandre 1, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1327.
14 Id. at 1328-29.
15 i at 1329.
16 IL at 1330-31.
17 Id. at 1331.
18 See id. at 1332 (finding that its interpretation does not raise constitutional issues);
id- at 1333 (refusing to address the issue of whether its interpretation could potentially
violate U.S. treaty obligations); id at 1333-34 (rejecting the argument that it must construe
the President's waiver authority broadly because of the broad presidential authority in ar.
eas of foreign policy).
19 Id. at 1334.
20 Id.; see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984) ("[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute."); id. at 844 ("We have long recognized that considerable weight
should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is
entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations
has been consistently followed by this Court...." (internal quotation marks omitted)),
21 See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
22 See infra Part IIIA.
23 See infra Part III.B.
24 See infra Part III.C.
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scope of Chevron to judicial deference to presidential interpretations
of ambiguities in foreign affairs or national security statutes delegat-
ing lawmaking power to the President. Part I gives the background of
the ambiguous amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
President Clinton's interpretation of it, and the court's treatment of
the amendment in Alejandre I. Part II discusses Chevron and its pro-
nouncement regarding judicial deference to agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes. Part II also discusses Chevrones progeny and its
impact on the separation of powers and institutional roles of the dif-
ferent players in the administrative state. Part fI examines the ratio-
nales behind Chevron and ties them to the instant case of the FSIA
amendment and Alejandre ff. This Part argues that the same rationales
invoked by the Chevron Court for judicial deference to agency inter-
pretations of ambiguous statutes, apply equally to President Clinton's
interpretation of the ambiguous waiver provision of the FSIA amend-
ment. Thus the Chevron rationales support the normative proposal of
general judicial deference to presidential interpretations of ambigui-
ties in foreign affairs and national security statutes delegating lawmak-
ing power to the President.
I
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMu1NIT[ES Acr ANMENDMErNT
AUTHORIZING EXECUTION OF BLOCKED PROPERTY AND THE
PRESIDENTIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE AMBIGUIY IN ITS
WAIVER PROVIsION
A. Background to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Amendments
Alisa Michelle Flatow, an American citizen studying in Israel, was
murdered on April 9, 1995 in the Gaza Strip when a suicide bomber
of the Palestinian terrorist group, the Islamic Jihad, drove a van
loaded with explosives into the bus she was riding.25 The Palestinian
Islamic Jihad is a Palestinian terrorist group supported and funded
entirely by the Islamic Republic of Iran.2 6 The Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act 27 of 1976, which affords immunity to foreign sovereigns,
shielded Iran and other states that either committed or supported ter-
rorist acts against United States citizens from civil liability for these
25 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 7-9 (D.D.C. 1998); 144 CoxG.
REc. H7267-H7268 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1998) (statement of Rep. Saxton).
26 Ratow, 999 F. Supp. at 8; 144 CONG. REc. H7267 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1998) (statement
of Rep. Saxton).
27 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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actions.28 In April 1996, prompted by the Flatow murder,29 Congress
enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
that, among other things, amended the FSIA to lift the immunity of
foreign states for certain sovereign terrorist acts.3 0 The amendment
gave federal courts jurisdiction over foreign states designated by the
Department of State as "countries supporting international terror-
ism" 31 for acts of terrorism committed or materially supported by that
state, resulting in the death or injury of a United States citizen.32 Five
months later, Congress enacted another amendment to the FSIA,
Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism, as part of the
1997 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act.33 Commonly known
as the "Flatow Amendment,"34 this provision, enacted for the benefit
of the Flatows,3 5 expressly provides for punitive damages in actions
brought under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to foreign im-
munity.3 6 The amendment also created a separate cause of action
against officials, agents, or employees of a foreign state that had lost
its jurisdictional immunity for an act of terrorism enumerated in 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a) (7).37
28 See id. § 1604; see also Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d
239, 247 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the FSIA shielded Libya from liability for the bomb-
ing of Pan Am Flight 103); Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 169 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (concluding that the FSIA shielded Iran from liability for the kidnapping and tortur-
ing of U.S. citizens in Lebanon by an Islamic terrorist group supported and funded by
Iran).
29 See 144 CONG. REc. H5710 (daily ed. July 16, 1998) (statement of Rep. Saxton)
(stating that the statute was changed "to give the Flatow family the ability to sue"); 144
CONG. Rxc. E1345 (daily ed.July 17, 1998) (statement of Rep. Schumer) (stating that Con-
gress amended the Anti-Terrorism Act in 1996 "precisely to help families like the Flatows").
30 Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, Title II, § 221(a),
110 Stat. 1241 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (Supp. IV 1998)).
31 "Countries supporting international terrorism" are designated by section 6Q) of
the Export Administration Act of 1979 or section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961. 50 U.S.C. § 24050) (1994). The foreign states designated sponsors of terrorism
pursuant to this are: Iran, Cuba, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and North Korea. 22 C.FR.
§ 126.1(d) (2000).
32 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (7) (Supp. IV 1998). The enumerated terrorist acts that give
rise to jurisdiction under this statute are: "personal injury or death that was caused by an
act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of
material support or resources" for such an act by an official of that state acting within his or
her official scope. Id.
33 Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. A, title I, sec. 101(c), § 589, 110 Stat. 3009-172 (1996)
(noted at 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (Supp. IV 1998)).
34 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 12 (D.D.C. 1998).
35 See 144 CONG. REC. H1095 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1998) (statement of Rep. Saxton),
36 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (7) (Supp. IV 1998); see also Ratow, 999 F. Supp. at 12 ("[T]lie
amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a) (7) expressly provided, inter alia, that punitive damages
were available in actions brought under the state sponsored terrorism exception to
immunity.").
37 Previously, this statute gave rise to jurisdiction, not a cause of action. § 589; Alejan-
dre v. Republic of Cuba, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1321-22 (S.D. Fla.), vacated by Alejandre v.
Telefonica Larga Distancia de P.R., Inc., 183 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 1999).
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As a result of these amendments to the FSIA, in Flatow v. Islamic
Republic ofIran,38 a federal district court found that it had jurisdiction
over the foreign sovereign state,39 and after Flatow obtained a default
judgment against Iran, 40 the court awarded a judgment exceeding
$247 million.4 1
B. Section 117 of Public Law 105-277 and the Presidential
Waiver Provision
Congress enacted the next amendment to the FSIA in 1998 as
section 117 of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supple-
mental Appropriations Act in 199942 to allow the Flatows to execute
the judgment in their favor against blocked Iranian property located
in the United States.43 President Clinton signed the appropriations
act on October 21, 1998 and the amendment to the FSIA became sec-
tion 117 of Public Law 105-277.44 Section 117(a) of Public Law 105-
38 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998).
-9 M at 34 ("This Court possess [sic] subject matterjurisdiction over this action and
personaljurisdiction over Defendants."); see also id. at 12-14 (discussing the amendment to
the FSIA and how it gives the court jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns).
40 Iran, of course, did not show up to court to contest the action. Ld. at 6. Under 28
U.S.C. § 1608 of the FSIA, however, plaintiffs in an action against a foreign sovereign who
defaults must establish "his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to die court." 28
U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1994); see also Tatow, 999 F. Supp. at 6 (discussing the required standard
for defaltjudgment against foreign sovereigns).
41 See Ratow, 999 F. Supp. at 5. The amendment to the FSIA providing courtsjurisdic-
tion over a state designated as a "state sponsor of terrorism," 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7),
granted courts jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns in two other cases. In Aldandre v. RPpub-
lc of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997), the families of the Brothers to the Rescue
pilots who were murdered by the Cuban airforce received ajudgment of over $187 million
for compensatory and punitive damages after the court found that it had jurisdiction over
Cuba pursuant to the FSIA amendment. Id. at 1247-48. In Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan
ArabJamahifiya, 995 F. Supp. 325 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd 162 F.3d 748 (2d Cir. 1998). cert.
denied 525 U.S. 1003 (1999), representatives and survivors of the victims of the terrorist
bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, whose earlier action against Libya was dismissed for lack
jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign in Smith v. Socialist People's LiAbyan Arab Jamahiriya,
101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996), survived a motion to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction by Libya as
the court found that 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (7) gave the court jurisdiction over the terrorist
state. Rein, 995 F. Supp. at 329-30.
42 Pub. L No. 105-277, div. A., title I, sec. 101(h), § 117(a), 112 SLat. 2681, 2631491
(1998) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.CQ §§ 1610(f) (1) (A), (1) (B), (2) (A), (2) (B) (Supp.
IV 1998)).
43 144 CONG. REc. H7419 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1998); 144 CoNc. REc. H7267 (daily ed.
Aug. 5, 1998); 144 CONG. REC. H5710 (daily ed. July 16, 1998).
44 Section 117 of Public Law 105-277 provides:
(a) EXCEPTION TO IMMUNITY FROM ATTACHMENT OR EXECU-
TION. Section 1610 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
(f) (1) (A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including but not
limited to section 208(f) of the Foreign Missions Act (22 U.S.C.
4308(f)), and except as provided in subparagraph (B), any prop-
erty with respect to which financial transactions are prohibited
or regulated pursuant to section 5(b) of the Trading with the
2001] 417
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277 authorizes execution against blocked property of foreign states, or
their agencies or instrumentalities, for the enforcement of judgments
for 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (7) actions brought as a result of terrorist activ-
ities by such states.45 Without this amendment, successful
§ 1605 (a) (7) plaintiffs would not be able to collect their judgments
because the State Department invariably blocks the assets of foreign
states designated as sponsors of terrorism in the United States.46 In-
Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 5(b)), section 620(a) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370(a)), sections 202 and 203
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701-1702), or any other proclamation, order, regulation, or li-
cense issued pursuant thereto, shall be subject to execution or
attachment in aid of execution of any judgment relating to a
claim for which a foreign state (including any agency or instru-
mentality or [sic] such state) claiming such property is not im-
mune under section 1605(a) (7).
(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply if, at the time the property is
expropriated or seized by the foreign state, the property has
been held in title by a natural person or, if held in trust, has been
held for the benefit of a natural person or persons.
2(A) At the request of any party in whose favor a judgment has been
issued with respect to a claim for which the foreign state is not
immune under section 1605(a) (7), the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Secretary of the State shall fully, promptly, and effec-
tively assist any judgment creditor or any court that has issued
any such judgment in identifying, locating, and executing against
the property of that foreign state or any agency or instrumental-
ity of such state.
(B) In providing such assistance, the Secretaries-
(i) may provide such information to the court under seal; and
(ii) shall provide the information in a manner sufficient to allow
the court to direct the United States Marshal's office to
promptly and effectively execute against that property.
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.-Section 1606 of title 28, United
States Code, is amended by inserting after "punitive damages" the fol-
lowing: ", except any action under section 1605(a) (7) or 1610(f)."
(c) EFFECIVE DATE. The amendments made by subsections (a)and (b)
shall apply to any claim for which a foreign state is not immune under
section 1605(a) (7) of title 28, United States Code, arising before, on,
or after the date of enactment of this Act.
(d) WAIVER. The President may waive the requirements of this section in
the interest of national security.
§ 117, 112 Stat. at 2681-491.
45 Id.
46 See Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 42 F. Supp. 2d. 1317, 1324 n.7 (S.D. Fla.) (not-
ing that, according to one State Department official, "'[blocking [sic] assets represents
one of the primary tools at the disposal of the United States to combat terrorism and other
conduct that threatens the security of the United States and its citizens, and to seek to
modify such conduct'" (citations omitted)), vacated by Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga Dis-
tancia de P.R., Inc., 183 F.Sd 1277 (11th Cir. 1999); see also 144 CoNG. REc. E2314 (daily
ed. Nov. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Forbes) ("This provision was made necessary be-
cause of the Administration's repeated efforts in Federal Court to block terrorism victims
from attaching assets of terrorist states to help satisfy judgments they had received by such
courts."); Signing Statement, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 1998 U.S.C.CA.N. 576, 581 (President
Clinton discussing the importance of his power to block assets of terrorist states and how
"[a]bsent [the President's] authority to waive section 117's attachment provision, it wotild
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deed, when the Flatows attempted to attach three properties in Wash-
ington, D.C. owned by the Iranian government to satisfy their $247
million judgment, the State Department intervened and blocked the
properties. 47 Congress specifically intended the amendment authoriz-
ing execution against blocked properties to deal with this problem. 45
Section 117 of Public Law 105-277 went even further and imposed an
affirmative duty upon the Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of
State to assist such plaintiffs in their execution. 49 Section 117 in-
cluded a waiver provision that authorized the President to "waive the
requirements of this section in the interest of national security."50
When President Clinton signed Public Law 105-277 he exercised the
waiver provision of section 117 "in the interest of national security."'
also effectively eliminate use of blocked assets of terrorist states in the national security
interests of the United States, including denying an important source of leverage).
47 144 CONG. REc. H5710 (daily ed. July 16, 1998) (statement of Rep. Sxxton) (dis-
cussing how when the Flatows attempted to attach property owned by the Iranian govern-
ment, "along came our own State Department and our own Treasury and said to tiejudge,
stop. You cannot perfect this judgment in the form of liens against those properties be-
cause there is another statute that gives us the ability to stop you and we will."); see also 144
CONG. REc. H7267 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1998) (statement of Rep. Saxton) (discussing how the
State Department andJustice Department objected to the attachment of Iranian properties
by the Flatows). The administration's antagonism to the amendment authorizing execu-
tion of blocked property of terrorist states remained evident in Al0jandre 1, where the gov-
ernment sided with the defendant Cuba to argue against the amendment and prevent the
plaintiff from attaching blocked Cuban assets. See Alejandre 1, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1327.
48 See 144 CoNG. RPc. H7267 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1998) (statement of Rep. Saxton)
(discussing why the amendment is needed so that the State Department will not be able to
prevent victims of terrorism from executing judgments in their favor); see also 144 CoxN.
REc. H7419 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Saxton) (arguing that the amend-
ment is necessary because "there has to be a price to pay" for terrorism, but that "our
government was protecting the rights of the State of Iran rather than the rights of the
Flatow family"). Ironically, the Flatows failed in their first attempt to make use of this new
law. In Thatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 67 F. Supp. 2d 535 (D. Md. 1999), affd, Flatow v.
Alavi Found., No. 99-2409, WL 1012956 (4th Cir. July 24, 2000), the court held that the
assets the Flatows were attempting to garnish did not belong to an instrumentality of the
Iranian Government under the FSIA and were therefore immune from execution. Id. at
543. This provision was codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f) (1) (A).
49 § 117(a), 112 Stat. at 2681-491.
50 It § 117(a), 112 Stat. at 2681-491.
51 Signing Statement, Pub. L No. 105-277, reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 576, 581
I am concerned about section 117 of the Treasury/General Government
appropriations section of the Act, which amends the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act. If this section were to result in attachment and execution
against foreign embassy properties, it would encroach on my authority
under the Constitution to "receive Ambassadors and other public Minis-
ters." Moreover, if applied to foreign diplomatic or consular property, sec-
tion 117 would place the United States in breach of its international treaty
obligations. It would put at risk the protection we enjoy at every embassy
and consulate throughout the world by eroding the principle that diplo-
matic property must be protected regardless of bilateral relations. Absent
my authority to waive section 117's attachment provision, it would also ef-
fectively eliminate use of blocked assets of terrorist states in the national
security interests of the United States, including denying an important
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By exercising this waiver, President Clinton intended to waive the en-
tirety of section 117 of Public Law 105-277, that is, the entire amend-
ment to 28 U.S.C. § 1610: both the section imposing the affirmative
duty on the secretaries under § 1610(f) (2) as well as the authorization
to execute against blocked property under § 1610(f) (1) (A).52 Even
before enacting the amendment to the FSIA authorizing attachment
of blocked properties, Congress was aware of the Administration's op-
position to it.5 3 Indeed, Congress passed the amendment in the first
place because the Administration was preventing successful plaintiffs
from attaching property owned by governments of terrorist coun-
tries.5 4 The President's exercise of the waiver provision of section 117
when signing Public Law 105-277 into law, therefore, came as no
surprise.
C. Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba
Plaintiffs first used 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (f) (1) (A) to execute a judg-
ment against a foreign state in Alejandre II,5 notwithstanding the pres-
idential waiver. On February 24, 1996, the Cuban Air Force shot
down planes of the Miami-based humanitarian organization Brothers
to the Rescue over international water without warning or provoca-
tion, killing four workers including Armando Alejandre. 56 In Alejan-
source of leverage.... To the extent possible, I shall construe section 117
in a manner consistent with my constitutional authority and with U.S. inter-
national legal obligations, and for the above reasons, I have exercised the
waiver authority in the national security interest of the United States.
Id.
52 Id, see also Presidential Determination No. 99-1, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,201 (Oct. 21, 1998)
("I hereby waive the requirements of section 117 [amending section 1610(f) (1) (A)] in the
interest of national security.").
53 144 CONG. REc. H5711 (daily ed. July 16, 1998) (statement of Rep. Obey). Repre-
sentative Obey noted:
in a letter from the administration, the letter indicates that this amendment
would substantially undermine the President's ability to use such assets as
leverage when economic sanctions are being used to modify the behavior of
a foreign state or in negotiations with that state. It said, for instance, that if
private claims were allowed to execute judgments ahead of these assets, the
President would be deprived of their use as leverage to gain concessions
from the North Koreans in the negotiating process, because in their judg-
ment this amendment does not just apply to Iran. It applies to all kinds of
other countries, including Cuba.
The administration also points out that the Supreme Court has recog-
nized the importance of the administration retaining this authority...
'Such blocking orders permit the President to maintain the foreign assets at
his disposal for use in negotiating the resolution of a declared national
emergency.'
Id.
54 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
55 Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (S.D. Fla.), vacated byAlejandre
v. Telefonica Larga Distancia de P.R., Inc., 183 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 1999).
56 Id. at 1320.
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dre v. Republic of Cuba (Alejandre 1) the district court awarded
Alejandre's representative compensatory and punitive damages total-
ing over $187 million in a 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a) (7) action.5 7 In Alejan-
dre 11, the district court of the Southern District of Florida garnished
blocked Cuban assets held by American corporations pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1610(f) (1) (A) to execute the judgment Alejandre had been
awarded.58 In Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba (Alejandre I), the United
States government ironically sided with defendant Cuba, arguing that
the court should interpret the presidential waiver of section 117 to
include the entire amendment and thus prevent attachment of
blocked Cuban assets.59 Nonetheless, the court held that the presi-
dential waiver under section 117 applied only to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1610(f) (2), the affirmative duty of the secretaries, and that the
waiver could not and did not apply § 1610(f) (1) (A).60 Concluding
that both the language and legislative history of section 117 were am-
biguous in this regard,6' the court relied on post-enactment state-
ments of several representatives to limit the scope of the presidential
waiver.62 The court limited the scope of the waiver while expressly
recognizing that this action was contrary to President Clinton's inter-
pretation of the waiver and intention in executing the waiver.63 The
57 Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
58 See Alejandre II, 42 F. Supp. 2d at1343. The assets were actually ovned by ETECSA,
a Cuban corporation that the district court found to be an "agency or instrumentality ofa
foreign state" and therefore within 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f) (1) (A). Id. at 1336. Aleandre lHwas
vacated on appeal when the Eleventh Circuit found that ETECSA ims not an agency or
instrumentality of Cuba and therefore not within 28 U.S.C § 1610 (f) (1) (A). Alejandre v.
Telefonica Larga Distancia de P.R., Inc., 183 F.3d 1277, 1286-88 (11 th Cir. 1999).
59 Alejandre 1, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1327-34. As discussed above, see supra notes 53-54 and
accompanying text, the administration strongly opposed the amendment authorizing exe-
cution of blocked property of terrorist states, thus explaining the curiosity of finding the
United States and Cuba on the same side of the lawsuit.
60 Alejandre II, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 132634.
61 IL at 1328-32 (discussing that while several members of Congress believed that the
waiver provision applied only to the affirmative duty of Secretaries, other members of Con-
gress believed that it would allow the President to w-aive the entirety of section 117, both
the new subsection § 1610(0 (1) and § 1610(0 (2)).
62 Id. at 1330-31; see also 144 CoNc. Rc. E2314 (daily ed. Nov. 12,1998) (statement of
Forbes). Representative Forbes noted that
The intent of this waiver was to allow the President, only in limited circum-
stances, to waive the requirement that the Secretary of State and Secretary
of the Treasury, under subsection (f) (2) (A), cooperate ith victims in lo-
cating terrorist assets. It w-as never intended to allow the President to waive
subsection (f) (1) (A), the change in the law which allows victims to attach
such assets they are able to find on their own. Unfortunately... the Presi-
dent issued a blanket waiver, in which he invoked a national security waiver
over [both subsections].... It should be clear that the w%aiver provision of
Section 117 only applies to Subsection (f) (2) (A).
Id.
63 Alejandre ii, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1331 ("The Court concludes that, contrary to the
President's intention in executing the waiver, Congress did not intend to give the Presi-
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court also rejected constitutional challenges to section 117 and re-
fused to address whether section 117 could potentially violate U.S.
treaty obligations. 64 The Alejandre II court next rejected the argument
that the waiver provision of section 117 should be construed broadly
based on precedent affording the President broad discretion in for-
eign affairs. 65 Finally, the court rejected the argument that it should
defer to the President's interpretation of section 117 based on the
Chevron doctrine.66 In making the Chevron argument, the government
reasoned that because administrative agencies are entitled to defer-
ence in their application of regulatory legislation, the President
should similarly enjoy such deference in its application of statutory
grants of executive authority.67 The court curtly dismissed the Chevron
argument: "Only a tortured reading of [Chevron] ... would have it
stand for the position" that the court should defer to the President's
interpretation regarding the scope of the waiver.6
The Alejandre 1 court correctly pointed out that Chevron deals
"with an administrative agency's construction of an ambiguous statute
that Congress has mandated that it administer"69 and does not man-
date that courts defer to a presidential interpretation of statutory am-
biguity. The Alejandre court was thus correct in its refusal to apply
Chevron. This Note, however, will now examine the rationales behind
the Chevron doctrine and illustrate that these same rationalesjustifying
judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of statutory ambiguity
apply equally, if not more powerfully, to President Clinton's interpre-
tation of section 117 of Public Law 105-277. This suggests that the
courts should extend the scope of Chevron to include judicial defer-
ence to presidential interpretations of ambiguities in foreign affairs
and national security statutes that delegate lawmaking power to the
President.
II
THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE
In Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 70
environmental groups challenged the Environmental Protection
Agency's interpretation of the term "stationary source" in the Clean
Air Act to include all polluting activities within an entire industrial
dent the broad authority to waive the new subsection (f) (1) when it gave him the power to
waive 'the requirements of this section.'").
64 Id at 1332-33.
65 Id. at 1333-34.
66 Id. at 1334.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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facility (known as the "bubble concept")7 1 This interpretation al-
lowed polluting firms to comply with the Clean Air Act by obtaining a
single permit for a whole facility (a "bubble"), rather than by ob-
taining individual permits for each polluting smokestack in the facil-
ity.72 The Clean Air Act did not contain a definition of the term
"stationary source," and the D.C. Circuit rejected the EPA's "bubble"
definition as inconsistent with the purposes of the Act and therefore
invalid.73 Reversing the D.C. Circuit on appeal, the Supreme Court
articulated a two-step test to determine the deference a reviewing
court should give to an agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute
that the agency is to administer.74 In step one, the court inquires
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at is-
sue."75 "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;,
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambigu-
ously expressed intent of Congress."76 When determining whether
Congress has spoken directly to the precise question at issue, the
court employs the traditional tools of statutory construction, looking
to both language and legislative history of the statute.77 If the court
determines that Congress has not spoken directly to the precise issue,
it proceeds to part two of the test. In this step "the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be neces-
sary in the absence of an administrative interpretation."78 Instead, "if
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute."79 Thus, under the Chevron
test, in the face of statutory ambiguity, courts should accept reasona-
ble agency interpretations.8 0 This pronouncement made Chevron a
landmark case81 and a watershed in administrative law and separation
71 I& at 840.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 841.
74 d. at 84244.
75 Id. at 843.
76 Id. at 842-43.
77 See id. at 843 n.9, 859-62.
78 Id. at 843 (footnote omitted).
79 Id.
80 Cynthia R. Farina, Statutoiy Interprdaton and the Balance of Power in the Adninistralive
State, 89 GOLUM. L. REv. 452, 460 (1989); Thomas AV Merrill, Judidal Deference to Executive
Precedent 101 YALE LJ. 969, 969 (1992); Hon. Antonin Scalia,Judidal Deference to Administra-
tivelnterpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE I.J. 511, 511; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration
After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L REv. 2071, 2074 (1990).
81 See Scalia, supra note 80, at 512 ("ChUron has proven a highly important decision-
perhaps the most important in the field of administrative law since Vermont YanIxe uclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC"); Hon. Kenneth W. Starr, Judidal Review in the PostCheron Era, 3
YALEJ. ON REG. 283, 284 (1986) ("Chevron has quickly become a decision of great impor-
tance, one of a small number of cases that every judge bears in mind when revieving
agency decisions."); see also PEm L. STRAuss E'r At-, Gr , omi & B&E's A).ILsrmrTWE
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of powers jurisprudence because it redefined judicial deference to the
executive. Chevron's rule ofjudicial deference to the agency interpre-
tation of ambiguities in statutes they administer "implicates the basic
problems concerning the institutional roles of the different players in
the administrative state."8 2 Indeed, Chevron is often regarded as a
"counter-Marbuy,"8 3 as it seems facially contrary to the fundamental
principle of Marbury v. Madison8 4 that "[i] t is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."s Ever
since Marbury, "determin[ing] 'what the law is' in the context of an
actual controversy that turns on a question of statutory meaning is the
quintessential judicial function."8 6
After Chevron, much of this quintessential judicial function be-
longs to the executive agency.8 7 Rust v. Sullivan88 further strength-
ened Chevron and its impact on the relationship between Congress,
the judiciary, and the executive. In Rust, the Supreme Court ex-
tended Chevron deference to agency reinterpretations of their own
previous constructions of statutes. Although stated as a judicial con-
cession of what will survive judicial review, this judicial acceptance of
an agency's freedom to change its own policies has strengthened the
LAw 621 (9th ed. 1995) (showing that Chevron has been cited more often in circuit courts
than the other landmark administrative law cases); id. at 620 ("In every case involving statu-
tory interpretation, think Chevron" (quoting Hon. Patricia M. Wald, Remarks at the Fourth
Annual Appellate Advocacy Program (Oct. 28, 1994))); Sunstein, supra note 80, at 2075
("[Chevron] has established itself as one of the very few defining cases in the last tventy
years of American public law.").
82 Herz, supra note 1, at 187; see also Farina, supra note 80, at 456 (arguing that "Chev-
ron invoked the principles of separation of powers and legitimacy" and thus "appeals to our
deepest constitutional unease about allocating power in the administrative state").
83 Merrill, supra note 80, at 969.
84 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
85 1I at 177; see Merrill, supra note 80, at 969-70 (arguing that Chevron makes "admin-
istrative actors the primary interpreters of federal statutes" and that this has "enormous
implications for the overall balance of power among the three branches of government");
Scalia, supra note 80, at 513 (stating that Chevron seems incompatible with Marbuiy); see also
Starr, supra note 81, at 283 (arguing that the Executive Branch "is displacing thejudiciary
in its traditional and jealously guarded law-declaring function"),
86 Farina, supra note 80, at 452.
87 Criticizing as extreme this shift in judicial role brought about by Chevron and its
progeny, Professor Farina observed that "[ifn the world according to Chevron, thejudici-
ary's role in interpreting regulatory statutes amounts to little more than serving as a
mouthpiece for legislative directives that are unequivocal and directly on point." Id. at 462.
63.
88 500 U.S. 173 (1991). In 1985, the Reagan-Bush appointed Department of Health
and Human Services reconstructed Title X of the Public Health Service Act, which autho-
rizes distribution of federal funds to family planning clinics that "offer a broad range of
acceptable and effective family planning methods and services" so as to "not consider abor-
tion an appropriate method of family planning." Id. at 178, 180. This was a dramatic
reconstruction of the agency's own previous interpretation of appropriate family planning
which did include abortion counseling. The Supreme Court accepted this new interpreta-
tion under Chevron. Id. at 187.
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relative power of the executive vis-A-vis Congress. A change in an
agency interpretation, brought about most likely by a change in the
administration, can now survive judicial review as long as it is reasona-
ble, and however unwelcome to Congress, can only be overcome by
legislation.8 9 Thus, to override the agency's interpretation, Congress
must either secure the President's agreement to this change, or mus-
ter the necessary votes to override a presidential veto.
Chevron alters the balance of the separation of powers by strength-
ening the executive's power at the expense of thejudiciary's power to
determine what the law is and at the expense of Congress's power to
make law. Critics of Chevron are unhappy about this power shift, yet
following Chevron, decisions of the Supreme Court90 and the lower
federal courts9' evidence Chevron's continuing message of deference
to the executive agency and the shift in the roles of the players in the
89 See STRAuss Er AL., supra note 81, at 630.
90 Se4 eg., Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), NA, 517 U.S. 735 (1996) (deferring to the
Comptroller of the Currency's definition of "interest" under the National Banking Act of
1864); ThomasJefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (1994) (deferring to the Health and
Human Service Secretary's Medicare distribution policy under the Social Security Act);
Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680 (1991) (deferring to the Secretary of La-
bor's interpretation of the statute authorizing black lung benefits); Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173 (1991) (deferring to the Health and Human Service Secretary's interpretation of
family planning appropriations statute); Martin v. Occupational Safety Health Review
Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144 (1991) (remanding for determination of whether the Secretary of
Labor's promulgation of coke oven emissions standards wvas a reasonable interpretation of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act); Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990)
(finding deference unnecessary where Congress did not delegate to the Secretary of Labor
the authority to administer the Agricultural Workers Protection Act); Sullivan %. Everhart,
494 U.S. 83 (1990) (deferring to the Health and Human Service Secretary's allocation
formula for distributing benefits under the Social Security Act); Bowen v. Georgetonm
Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988); Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 US. 388 (1987)
(deferring to the Comptroller of the Currency's decision that a bank's offering of discount
brokerage services did not violate the National Bank Act); Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst.,
476 U.S. 974 (1986) (deferring to the FDA's exemption of corn shipment from aflatoxin
action level); Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sy ., 468 U.S. 137
(1984) (finding no ambiguity in the Glass-Steagall Act's definition of "security").
91 See, ag., Am. Trucking Ass'n, Inc., v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per
curiam), modified on rehg, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. grante, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000)
(refusing to defer the EPA's promulgation of air quality standards under the Clean Air Act
where the agency failed to articulate an intelligible principle); Atchison, Topeka and Santa
Fe Ry. Co. v. Pena, 44 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 1994) (withholding C0evurn deference from Fed-
eral Railvay Administration's interpretation of the Hours of Service Act where the FRA had
not been granted rulemaking authority by Congress); Envtl. Def. Fund v, EPA, 898 F.2d
183 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (withholding Chevron deference from EPA's promulgation of air qual-
ity standards where interpretation did not adequately consider the statute's requirements);
Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987) (deferring to the
Health and Human Service Secretary's decisions to deny home nursing care company ex-
emption from Medicare reimbursement limits); Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock,
811 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (withholding Chevron deference from Secretary of Labor's
delayed application of field sanitation standards that mas not a reasonable interpretation of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act); Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 757 F.2d 354
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (withholding Chevron deference from FDA's promulgation of aflatoxin
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administrative state. In the recent cases of FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.92 and INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre,93 the Supreme Court contin-
ued to extend Chevron deference to agency interpretations of statutory
ambiguities.
This Note argues that courts should now extend Chevron defer-
ence to presidential interpretations of ambiguities in foreign affairs
and national security statutes that afford the President lawmaking
power.94 The next section of this Note examines the rationales of
Chevron and illustrates how they equally apply to the presidential inter-
pretation of the waiver provision in the FSIA amendment to section
117 of Public Law 105-277, and thus how they apply to presidential
interpretations of ambiguities in foreign affairs and national security
statutes generally delegating lawmaking power to the President.
III
ANALYSIS OF THE RATIONALES OF CHEVRON AND THEIR
APPLICATION TO THE PRESIDENT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE WAIVER
PROVISION OF SECTION 117
The three rationales behind Chevron and the role it affords to the
judiciary regarding deference to the executive branch are delega-
action levels where doing so conflicted with the clear intent of the Food, Drug, & Cosmetic
Act).
92 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1297, 1300 (2000) (noting that "agencies are generally entitled to
deference in the interpretation of statutes that they administer" and that "a reviewing court
must respect the agency's construction of the statute so long as it is permissible").
93 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999) (stating that the lower court should have applied the
principles of deference described in Chevron: whether "'the statute [was] silent or ambigu-
ous with respect to the specific issue' before it," and if so, "'whether the agency's answer
[was] based on a permissible construction of the statute.'").
94 The Supreme Court has held that the President has independent lawmaking pow-
ers relating to foreign affairs. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 682 (1981)
(stating that the President has power to enter into some sole executive agreements); Pfizer,
Inc., v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1978); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S.
126 (1938) (explaining that the President has exclusive authority to recognize a foreign
state or government); Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1997)
(noting that the President has power to determine which foreign governments have access
to United States courts). See generally Louis HENXIN, FOREiGN AFFAiRs AND THE UNITED
STATES CoNSTrruTION 31-62 (1996) (discussing presidential lawmaking power relating to
foreign affairs); Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REv. 649,
661 (2000) (same); Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 CoLMt. L.
Rxv. 1, 47-56 (1992) (same). Of course, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C,
§ 1605 (a) (7) (A), whereby Congress delegated to the President the power to determine
which nations are "state sponsors of terrorism" and are therefore not extended sovereign
immunity, is itself a lawmaking power. Id. All of these are examples of presidential law-
making-foreign affairs or national security statutes in which Congress has delegated to
the President the power to make law. It is to presidential interpretations of ambiguities in
these types of statutes that this Note argues that courts should award Chevron deference.
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tion,95 democratic accountability, 96 and expertise. 97 Though Chevron
deals with judicial deference to interpretations by administrative agen-
cies rather than by the President, these agencies are a part of the exec-
utive98-indeed subordinate to the President-and the rationales
dictating deference to them also suggest deference to their leader.99
This Note will now examine the rationales behind Chevron and show
how they equally apply to judicial deference to President Clinton's
95 Farina, supra note 80, at 466; Merrill, supra note 80, at 969; Scalia, supra note 80, at
516; Sunstein, supra note 80, at 2084; see also infra Part HI.A (analyzing the delegation
rationale).
96 Farina, supra note 80, at 466-67; Merrill, supra note 80, at 978; Scalia, supra note 80,
at 515; Sunstein, supra note 80, at 2086-87; see also infra Part I1.B (analyzing the democratic
accountability rationale).
97 Scalia, supra note 80, at 514; Starr, supra note 81, at 309; Sunstein, supra note 80, at
2087-88; see also infra Part I.C (analyzing the expertise rationale). In addition to the
above three rationales that are used by the Clevon Court, it is worth mentioning another
justification, not offered by the Court, that of uniformity. See Herz, supra note 1, at 195
n.48 ("Because federal agencies have a nationwidejurisdiction and federal courts of ap-
peals do not, greaterjudicial deference will lend uniformity to federal law."); see also Scalia,
supra note 80, at 517 ("One of the major disadvantages of having the courts resolve ambi-
guities is that they resolve them for ever and ever... ."). The uniformityjustfication for
Chevron deference would also apply to this Note's suggestion of expandingjudicidal defer-
ence to interpretations made by the President. This Note ill not further elaborate on it
because it is merely a post hoc rationalization.
98 In Chevron, the Court discussed agencies and the executive interchangeably, sug-
gesting that the rationales behind deference to an agency's interpretation apply to defer-
ence given to any executive interpretation. As Justice Stevens noted in Cheron, the
Supreme Court has "long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer."
Cheron, 467 U.S. at 844. Indeed, the democratic accountability rationale of Chevron ap-
plies with even greater force to deference to a presidential interpretation than to defer-
ence to an interpretation by an agency subordinate to the President, which is twice
removed from the electorate. See infra Part m.B. In Chevron, the Court acknowledges that:
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Execu-
tive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Govern-
ment to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests which
Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to
be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in
light of everyday realities.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. This democratic accountability rationale of Chevron, would be
served even further were it the President rather than an agency interpreting an ambiguity.
As Professor Merrill states: "An agency,... while 'not directly accountable to the people,' is
subject to the general oversight and supervision of the President, who is accountable."
Merrill, supra note 80, at 978 (quoting Cleron, 467 U.S. at 865-66); see also infra Part II.B
(discussing democratic accountability).
99 The President is already heavily involved in the process of agency rulemaking. For
example, in the 1992 presidential campaign, one of the issues was the potential rescinding
of the Department of Health's regulation withholding federal funds from family planning
or medical services that included counseling about abortions. &e Peter L Strauss, Presiden-
t/al Rulemaking; 72 Cnr.-KEm" L Rzv. 965, 967 (1997) ("[T]he President's wiflingness to
take political responsibility, even for generally popular rulemaking initiatives, reflects our
growing awareness and acceptance that rulemaking is not simply a technocratic process
performed in neutrality by objective experts; rulemaking has a distinctly political cast, and
that may make the President's actions seem even comforting.").
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interpretation of the waiver provision of section 117 of Public Law
105-277-an ambiguity 00 within a foreign affairs and national secur-
ity 1 statute delegating lawmaking power to the President. 10 2 This in
turn suggests giving judicial deference to presidential interpretations
of ambiguities in foreign affairs and national security statutes that
delegate lawmaking power to the President. It is important to note
that the statute at issue must delegate lawmaking power to the Presi-
dent. This is required for purposes of symmetry: Chevron only extends
deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes that Con-
gress has delegated to the agency to administer. 0 3 Chevron thus sup-
poses some lawmaking power on the part of the interpreting agency.
The suggestion to extend judicial deference to presidential interpreta-
tions of ambiguities in foreign affairs and national security statutes
applies only to those that delegate lawmaking power to the President.
A. Delegation
The first rationale behind the Chevron doctrine is that when a stat-
ute is ambiguous or silent regarding a particular issue, Congress has
implicitly delegated to the agency the task of interpreting the ambigu-
100 Clearly, the waiver provision of section 117 of Public Law 105-277 is ambiguous. See
supra note 62 and accompanying text; infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
101 The ambiguity is within the statute in the realms of both foreign affairs and na-
tional security- the amendment is to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act which is self-
evidently a foreign affairs statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1601-1610 (1994). The waiver provision
of section 117 of the amendment states that "The President may waive the requirements of
this section in the interest of national security." Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. A., title I, sec.
101(h), § 117(d), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-491 (noted at U.S.C. § 1610 (Supp. IV 1998)) (em-
phasis added).
102 Section 117 delegates to the President the affirmative power to waive the require-
ments of the section in the interest of national security. § 117, 112 Stat. at 2681-491. This is
clearly and expressly a lawmaking power. Indeed, the President interpreted the ambiguity
while he was effecting this lawmaking power-that is, while he was exercising the waiver
provision. Furthermore, it is the President who decides which nations are designated as a
"state sponsor of terrorism" and thus the nations to which section (f) (1) (A) of the amend-
ment, the section authorizing execution of blocked property of terrorist states, even ap-
plies. See supra note 41 and accompanying text; 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f) (1) (A) (Supp. IV
1998). The fact that the President chooses the countries to which the amendment applies
is also a lawmaking power-he decides to whom the law applies. See United States v. Cur-
tiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Curtiss-Iriight is a classic case of delegation
of lawmaking powers to the President, when Congress delegated to the President the
power to decide which countries would be subject to an arms embargo. This was deemed a
delegation, albeit a constitutional one, of legislative powers to the President, id. at 320-22,
and is analogous to the power delegated to the President in Alejandre lI-the power to
decide which countries are affected by the amendment authorizing execution of blocked
properties. See also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (delegating to the President power
to decide who may obtain passports);J. IV. Hampton, Jr., Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394
(1928) (delegating to the President the power to decide which products of which countries
should be subject to tariffs and the schedule of custom duties to be levied on them).
103 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
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ity and determining the issue.'0 4 Under Chevron, ambiguity in a stat-
ute, where the court cannot discern the congressional intent, creates
an irrebuttable presumption that Congress meant to leave the resolu-
tion of the ambiguity to the agency.105 Deference under Chevron is
necessary "to avoid judicial usurpation of functions Congress wished
to entrust to the agency."106 This deference is thus justified in terms
of congressional intent,10 7 and statutory ambiguity indicates congres-
sional intent to delegate resolution of an unsettled issue to the
agency.
Though critics of the delegation rationale of Cieuron point
out that the presumption of implicit delegation by Congress in the
face of statutory ambiguity or silence regarding a particular issue is
somewhat divorced from reality, 08 both the courts'09 and academ-
104 "If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express dele-
gation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regula-
tion.... Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is
implicit rather than explicit." Id. at 843-44. The Court continued: "a court may not substi-
tute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by
the administrator." Id.
105 See id. at 843-44, 865-66; Farina, supra note 80, at 469-70 ([T]his presumption-
that ambiguity equals legislative intent to empower the agency-is irrebuttable."); Merrill,
supra note 80, at 969 ("The [Chevron] Courtjustified this new general rule of deference by
positing that Congress has implicitly delegated interpretive authority to all agencies
charged with enforcing federal law."); Scalia, supra note 80, at 516 (noting that "in the case
of ambiguity, agency discretion is meant").
106 Farina, supra note 80, at 466.
107 See, e-g., Robert A. Anthony, hdh Agency Interpretations Should Bind Cithens and the
Courts?, 7 YAJEJ. ON RE-. 1, 4 (1990) ("The threshold issue for the court is always one of
congressional intent did Congress intend the agency's interpretation to bind the
courts?"); Herz, supra note 1, at 195 ("Under this now common view of the theoretical
underpinning ofjudicial deference, the need for and extent of deference is a function of
congressional intent." (footnote omitted)); Sunstein, supra note 80, at 2084 ("[T]he [CheL-
ron] Court quite rightly implied that any principle of deference is a product of Congress's
explicit or implicit instructions on that question.... Cours must defer to agnty int iretations
if and when Congress has told them to do so.").
108 See, e.g.,John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in JudidalRerie, 77 Tax. L RL-.
113, 198 (1998) ("[I]mplicit delegation theory lacks any solid basis in actual congressional
intent."); Farina, supra note 80, at 470 ("Chevron offers no evidence to support its conclu-
sion that silence or unclarity in a regulatory statute typically represents Congress's deliber-
ate delegation of meaning-elaboration power to the agency."); Herz, supra note 1, at 195-96
(arguing that "Chevron's presumption is particularly counterfactual in equating ambiguity
with delegation" because "[t]he notion that Congress has delegated interpretive authority
to the agency is likely to be wholly fictional in any case where the delegation is not ex-
press"); i. at 195 ("The rivalry between the legislative and executive branches, com-
pounded by the now longstanding phenomenon of powers separated not only by the
Constitution but by political party, should raise doubts that Congress actually wants to
hand over power to the agencies."); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreling Statutes in the Regulatloy
State; 103 HARv. L REv. 407, 445 (1989) ("An ambiguity is simply not a delegation of law-
interpreting power. Chevron confuses the two.").
109 See, eg., Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), NA, 517 U.S. 735, 74041 (1996) (acknowledg-
ing a "presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implemen-
tation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost,
CORNE=L LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:411
ia 110 have recognized the validity of Chevron's implicit delegation. Im-
plicit delegation, even if it is a legal fiction as asserted by its critics, is
"unquestionably better" than case-by-case evaluation."' The advan-
tage of this presumption of implicit delegation is that
Congress now knows that the ambiguities it creates, whether inten-
tionally or unintentionally, will be resolved, within the bounds of
permissible interpretation, not by the courts but by a particular
agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily be known. The legislative
process becomes less of a sporting event when those supporting and
opposing a particular disposition do not have to gamble upon
whether, if they say nothing about it in the statute, the ultimate an-
swer will be provided by the courts . . . rather [than] by the
[agency].112
by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree
of discretion the ambiguity allows"); Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696
(1991) ("When Congress, through express delegation or the introduction of an interpre-
tive gap in the statutory structure, has delegated policymaking authority to an administra.
tive agency, the extent ofjudicial review of the agency's policy determinations is limited.");
Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) ("A precondition to deference under
Chevron is a congressional delegation of administrative authority."); Homemakers N.
Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408, 411 (7th Cir. 1987) ("If the legislation either cdls for
the agency's decision or contains no disposition of the subject, then the agency has been
deputized to make a rule, and its decision should be respected.").
110 See, e.g., Farina, supra note 80, at 469 ("If Congress has not itself unambiguously
resolved the precise substantive issue, then [under Chevron we presume] that it either 'ex-
plicitly' or 'implicitly' delegated to the agency the interpretive task."); Merrill, supra note
80, at 969 ("The [Chevron] Courtjustified this new general rule of deference by positing
that Congress has implicitly delegated interpretive authority to all agencies charged with
enforcing federal law."); Scalia, supra note 80, at 516 ("Chevron... replaced th[e] statute-
by-statute evaluation (which was assuredly a font of uncertainty and litigation) with an
across-the-board presumption that, in the case of ambiguity, agency discretion is meant.").
111 Scalia, supra note 80, at 517. As Justice Scalia pointed out:
If the Chevron rule is not a 100% accurate estimation of modern congres-
sional intent, the prior case-by-case evaluation was not so either-and was
becoming less and less so, as the sheer volume of modem dockets made it
less and less possible for the Supreme Court to police diverse application of
an ineffable rule. And to tell the truth, the quest for the "genuine" legisla-
tive intent is probably a wild-goose chase anyway. In the vast majority of
cases I expect that Congress neither (1) intended a single result, nor (2)
meant to confer discretion upon the agency, but rather (3) didn't think
about the matter at all.
Id- Congress did not actually think about the ambiguity of the waiver provision of section
117 of Public Law 105-277. See supra Part I.B. This, however, does not conflict with Chev.
ron's presumption of implicit delegation-it fits exactly into it. Under the Chevron ratio-
nale, if Congress considered an issue but left it ambiguous in the statute, Chevron assumes
that it must have delegated its resolution to the agency. See supra notes 104-10 and accom-
panying text. Nor does this detract from Justice Scalia's argument, because regardless of
whether Congress purposefully left an issue unresolved or merely did not think about it,
Chevron's presumption of implicit delegation is superior to judicial, case-by-case determina-
tion. Scalia, supra note 80, at 517.
112 Scalia, supra note 80, at 517; cf. Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Crimi-
nal Law?, 110 HARv. L. REv. 469, 493 (1996) (arguing for Chevron's application to federal
criminal statutes, stating, "Congress enjoys the institutional economies of incomplete sped-
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Whether or not a fiction when the Chevron Court made the deci-
sion, after Chevron Congress knows that in a statute that an agency is to
administer, that agency will resolve any ambiguity regarding a specific
issue or silence regarding a specific issue in the statute. The ambigu-
ity regarding the scope of the waiver provision in section 117 of Public
Law 105-277 can similarly be viewed as an implicit delegation by Con-
gress to the executive to define the scope of the waiver provision. The
provision "[ t]he President may waive the requirements of this section
in the interest of national security"113 is clearly ambiguous regarding
whether the President may waive the provision allowing attachment or
only the affirmative duties of the secretaries. Congress, however, was
aware of this ambiguity. Indeed, members of Congress had shared
different views regarding the scope of the waiver. some believed the
scope was narrow, others that it was broad.114
The fact that Congress was aware of this specific issue, yet left it
unresolved, suggests that it either could not resolve the issue on its
own or believed that it would be best if the executive was left to resolve
it. Certainly, both the fact that the President is heavily involved in the
administration of this section 15 and that he is to make his decision in
"the interest of national security"1 6 suggest that Congress believed
the President would be best at interpreting the proper scope of the
waiver provision.
Viewed in this way Congress's decision to leave unresolved an is-
sue of which it was aware fits neatly within the delegation rationale of
Chevron. Congress delegated the resolution of the ambiguity to the
executive body best fit to resolve it-not to an agency of the executive
in this case but to the chief executive-the President. The delegation
rationale of Chevron therefore calls for judicial deference to the Presi-
dent's interpretation of the waiver provision of section 117, as its am-
biguity suggests a delegation by Congress to the President to "fill in
the blank." Similarly, the same delegation rationale suggests that
courts should defer to presidential interpretations of ambiguities in
statutes that Congress has delegated to the President to administer.
fication regardless of whether it's the judiciary or theJustice Department that finishes the
task").
113 Pub. L No. 105-227, div. A., title I, sec. 101(h), § 117(d), 112 Stat. 2681, 2631-491
(1998) (noted at 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (Supp. IV 1998)).
114 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
115 The President designates any "state sponsor of terrorism" to which the amendment
applies. 22 U.S.C. § 2371(a) (1994); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(7)(A), 1610(0)(1)(A) (Supp. IV
1998); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(j)(1)(A) (1994). In addition, Secretaries assist in the execu-
tion ofjudgment against that state. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(0 (2). Finally the President decides
whether or not to "waive the requirements of this section." § 117, 112 Stat. at 2631-491.
116 § 117, 112 Stat. at 2681-491.
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B. Democratic Accountability
The second rationale of Chevron is that because agencies are
more democratically accountable to the electorate than judges, agen-
cies are better suited to resolve delegated issues left open by Con-
gress. 117 When an executive agency is to implement a statute, "the
resolution of [ambiguities left within it by Congress] necessarily in-
volves policy judgment. Under our democratic system, policy judg-
ments are not for the courts but for the political branches; Congress
having left the policy question open, it must be answered by the Exec-
utive."11 The executive is politically accountable while courts are
not-it is therefore more democratic for the courts to defer to an
interpretation of the executive than to resolve an ambiguity on their
own. 119 Thus, Chevron shifts interpretive power from the courts to the
executive: 120
[Federal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to re-
spect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsi-
bilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving
the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not
judicial ones: "Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the po-
litical branches."' 2 '
Thejudiciary, according to Chevron, "is an inappropriate body to make
the kinds of policy choices that are unavoidable in construing contem-
porary regulatory statutes.' 22 The justification for deference voices
fundamental concerns about legitimacy and "echoes the Lockean view
117 Duffy, supra note 108, at 191 ("[T]he [Chevron] Court ultimately supported its def-
erence principle with two intertwined policy reasons-agency expertise and democratic
accountability."); Merrill, supra note 80, at 978 (stating that Chevron "broke new ground by
invoking democratic theory as a basis for requiring deference to executive
interpretations").
118 Scalia, supra note 80, at 515.
119 See Merrill, supra note 80, at 978 (arguing that democratic accountability supplied
the justification for switching the default rule from independentjudgment by the courts to
deference to the executive); see alsoAtchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pena, 44 F.3d
437, 445 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (discussing the proper role of the
judiciary), aff'dsub nom. Bhd. Locomotive Eng'rs v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
516 U.S. 152 (1996). Judge Easterbrook noted:
When the statute tells the executive branch to achieve a goal, the choices
made in pursuit of that objective are political in nature. The President
rather than ajudge decides how to execute the laws, and a court therefore
must respect the discretionary choices a coordinate branch of government
has made in the course of implementation.
Id.
120 Starr, supra note 81, at 312.
121 Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984)
(citations omitted).
122 Farina, supra note 80, at 467.
EXTENDING CHEVRON DEFERENCE
that the exercise of power in a democratic government can be defined
only through accountability to its source, the electorate." 1'
The President is clearly more democratically accountable than
the courts or the executive agencies. First, at least in their first term,
Presidents are certainly very accountable to the voters because they
seek re-election-a source of accountability not shared with either the
courts or the agencies. Even second term Presidents remain account-
able assuming that they prefer their party to retain control of the ex-
ecutive. Second, the very fact that Presidents are elected and not
appointed, as judges and agency administrators are, already creates
democratic accountability because the elected President and the Presi-
dent's views and policies presumably reflect the preferences of the vot-
ers. Appointed courts, on the other hand, are accountable to no one,
and at best, reflect only the preferences of the President, and are
twice removed from the voters. Similarly, the agencies are only ac-
countable to the President and are also twice removed from the voter.
Chevron's rationale of democratic accountability therefore applies
even more strongly to the President than it does to agencies, because
the principle of democratic accountability applies even more strongly
to the President than it does to the agencies.
Indeed, even according to the Chevron Court itself, deference to
the President's interpretation of an ambiguity rather than to an
agency's interpretation would better serve the democratic rationale:
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of
the Government to make such policy choices-resolving the com-
peting interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not
resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the [executive]. 124
The democratic accountability rationale of Chevron thus applies with
more force to suggest that courts should award deference to President
Clinton's interpretation of the ambiguous waiver provision of section
117 of Public Law 105-277 as he is more accountable than the courts
to the United States electorate.1 25 This same rationale also suggests
that courts should therefore defer to presidential interpretations of
ambiguities in statutes that Congress has delegated to the President to
123 1&; see also Scalia, supra note 80, at 517 (arguing that one of Chevon's greatest
advantages from the standpoint of governmental theory is that it permits "appropriate po-
litical participation").
124 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
125 For example, Professor Merrill argues that "[d]emocratic theory supplied the justi-
fication [for Chevron]: agency decisionmaking is ala)s more democratic thanjudicial deci-
sionmaking because all agencies are accountable (to some degree) to the President, and
the President is elected by the people." Merrill, supra note 80, at 978-79. By extending
Chevron deference to the President, however, we cut out the "middle-man," serving democ-
racy even further.
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administer because the President is more democratically accountable
than the agencies.
C. Expertise
The third rationale behind Chevron is that the courts, which are
not necessarily experts in the field of law the ambiguous statute is ad-
dressing, should defer to the executive, which is such an expert and
has an "intense familiarity" with the history and purposes of the legis-
lation and a "practical knowledge of what will best effectuate those
purposes."1 26 "[SIometimes interpretation is not simply a matter of
uncovering legislative will, but also involves extratextual considera-
tions of various kinds, including judgments about how a statute is best
or most sensibly implemented,"'127 and, as the Chevron Court stated
bluntly, "j]udges are not experts in the field.' 128
An agency obviously enjoys a more thorough understanding than
the generalist judiciary of how a statute's various provisions or its
legislative history interrelate... [and] inevitably enjoys an edge in
understanding technical concepts and terminology contained in
the statute.... These advantages of agency expertise are all the
more evident during an era of burgeoning judicial caseloads, when
judges must move rapidly from one area of the law to another ....
... Agency administrators, who have extensive experience...
are much better placed than generalist judges to make the policy
decisions .... 129
Under Chevron, therefore, reviewing courts defer to the executive be-
cause the executive agency will make more correct decisions regard-
ing the particular issue.'30
The Chevron rationale of deferring to the executive because of its
expertise applies equally to the case of President Clinton's interpreta-
tion of the waiver provision of section 117. The President is the ex-
pert in foreign affairs and national security, which are both among the
core powers of the executive.' 3' Indeed, in the realm of national se-
126 Scalia, supra note 80, at 514; see also Bradley, supra note 94, at 662 (noting that
courts defer to the executive branch's views "based upon its status as an able and knowl-
edgeable representative of United States interests"); Duffy, supra note 108, at 191 ("(Tlhe
[Chevron] Court ultimately supported its deference principle with two intertwined policy
reasons-and democratic accountability.").
127 Sunstein, supra note 80, at 2088.
128 Clweron, 467 U.S. at 865.
129 Starr, supra note 81, at 309-10.
130 Scalia, supra note 81, at 514 ("[Agencies] are more likely than the courts to reach
the correct result.").
131 Starr, supra note 81, at 299; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936) (stating that "we are here dealing not alone with an authority
vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority plus
the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the
federal government in the field of international relations"); Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d
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curity and foreign affairs, courts already recognize the broad scope of
the President's authority,13 2 and Congress grants the executive broad
discretion.133 Thus it is the President who knows best what the inter-
ests of national security discussed in the waiver provision are. The
President also knows best what effect the authorization to attach
blocked property and the inability to successfully block the foreign
assets of terrorist states will have on the bargaining power and security
interests of the United States.134
Clearly, deferring to the President's interpretation of the ambigu-
ous waiver provision of section 117 of Public Law 105-277 would serve
the rationales of Chevron. Furthermore, the expertise rationale sug-
gests extending Chevron deference generally to presidential interpreta-
tions of ambiguities in foreign affairs and national security statutes
delegating lawmaking power to the President.
CONCLUSION
In Chevron, the Supreme Court pronounced that courts should
defer to interpretations of ambiguous statutes by the agencies Con-
gress has designated to administer them. This Note has proposed to
expand the Chevron doctrine and extend judicial deference to presi-
dential interpretations of ambiguities in foreign affairs and national
security statutes delegating to the President a lawmaking power. By
examining one such instance-the amendment to the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act authorizing execution of blocked assets of terror-
ist states, and President Clinton's interpretation of this amendment's
ambiguous waiver provision-this Note has shown that deferring to
the President's interpretation would serve the three rationales of
Chevron.
1043, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., dissenting) ("This principle of deference applies
with special force where the subject of that analysis is a delegation to the Executive of
authority to make and implement decisions relating to the conduct of foreign affairs. Such
authority is fundamentally executive in nature."), af'd, 484 U.S. 1 (1987).
132 See, eg., Curtiss-Wight 299 U.S. at 320 (discussing the deference and discretion
enjoyed by the President as the "sole organ" of federal government in field of international
relations); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 42 F. Supp. 2d. 1317, 1334 (S.D. Fla.) (agreeing
with the government that the executive enjoys broad discretion in foreign affairs), varated
by Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga Distancia de P.R., Inc., 183 F3d 1277 (11th Cir. 1999).
133 See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (recognizing as permissible Congress's
delegation to the executive of the lawmaking power to decide who may obtain passports);
Chicago & S. AirLines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 (1948) ("Congress
may of course delegate very large grants of its power over foreign commerce to the Presi-
dent."); Criss-Wrgh, 299 U.S. at 320-22 (recognizing as permissible Congress's delegation
to the President of the power to decide which countries would be subject to an arms em-
bargo.); J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (recognizing as
permissible Congress's delegation to the President of the lawmaking power to decide
which products of which countries should be subject to tariffs and the schedule of custom
duties to be levied on them).
134 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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First, the ambiguity of the waiver provision suggests that Congress
could not resolve the issue of the waiver's scope.135 In light of Chev-
ron, this suggests that Congress left the resolution of the issue to the
body it best saw fit to do so-the President. Furthermore, extending
the Chevron doctrine to include implicit delegation to the President to
resolve ambiguities in statutes that the President is to implement
would be superior to the current case-by-case interpretation of ambi-
guities as the Alejandre I court's interpretation of the waiver provision
evidences. Congress would thereby enjoy the benefits already associ-
ated with the presumption of implied delegation to the agencies. 136
Second, since the President is more democratically accountable
than the courts and, indeed, even more than the agencies, extending
judicial deference to President Clinton's interpretation of the waiver
provision would further serve the second rationale of Chevron, that of
democratic accountability.
Finally, deferring to the President's interpretation of the ambigu-
ous waiver provision would serve the expertise rationale of Chevron.
This waiver, to be exercised in the interests of national security, is
clearly within the President's area of expertise.
The rationales behind Chevron-delegation, democratic account-
ability, and expertise-therefore provide a compelling argument to
award judicial deference to President Clinton's interpretation of the
ambiguous waiver provision. This in turn suggests extending judicial
deference to interpretations by the President of ambiguities in na-
tional security or foreign affairs statutes that delegate lawmaking
power to the President.
135 See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
136 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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